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Driving Impulses 
G.H. Mead (1863-1931) oriented much of his intellectual efforts around three 
unavoidable questions for anyone living in a modern society: how are selfhood, 
knowledge, and politics understood and organized in such a society? Modern 
individuals continually seek answers to questions although nobody has ever come up 
with a definitive answer to them. Modernity, in other words, confronts us with 
inevitable problematics that fundamentally shape the way in which we think about 
certain topics. For the purposes of my discussion of Mead, I focus upon three of these 
modern problematics: science, selfhood, and democratic politics. But before I discuss 
Mead’s treatment of these problem areas, allow me to briefly situate Mead as a 
pragmatist in relation to Dewey and James within pragmatism.  
 Of all the contexts framing the nature and evolution of Mead’s thinking, one 
emerges as particularly relevant - the city of Chicago at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Mead was not a Chicagoan by birth, however, nor did he grow up in the city. 
He was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863. Six years later, 
his father, Hiram Mead, was appointed a chair of theology at a seminary in Oberlin, 
Ohio, and it was in this small Midwestern town that George Mead spent his 
childhood, attending Oberlin College between 1880 and 1883. In 1887 he was 
accepted at Harvard where he studied philosophy with William James, a prominent 
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figure of American philosophical pragmatism. This was the first time that Mead had 
come across this philosophical doctrine. But Mead’s most significant encounter was 
with John Dewey, who invited Mead to join him at the University of Michigan at Ann 
Arbor in 1891. This marked the beginning of a friendship and professional 
collaboration that would last for the remainder of their lives. In 1894, Mead followed 
Dewey to the newly opened University of Chicago and remained there until the end of 
his career in 1931.  
 Although deeply influenced by James and Dewey, Mead nevertheless 
developed a unique understanding of pragmatist philosophy. Classical pragmatism 
emphasizes a processual and relational world-view, a naturalistic and evolutionary 
conception of science, and a radically democratic agenda of social reform through 
school, social settlements, and other social institutions. Pragmatists seek to find an 
alternative to the point of view of ‘mechanical science’ that had dominated the 
western variant of modernity from Descartes to Kant. But as Mead writes: “the 
Romantic idealists changed all that. For them, the forms arose in the very process of 
overcoming antinomies, overcoming obstacles.”i (MTNC, 155) By supplementing 
Hegelian idealism with Darwin’s evolutionary theory, pragmatists challenge the 
prevalent mechanical and individualistic conception of action, human autonomy, and 
freedom, and restate these problems in evolutionary and social terms.  
 
Processual and Relational World-View 
Mead’s holistic view of the social world is that it is forever in motion, perpetually 
in the midst of historically rooted, dynamic processes of renewal and re-creation. 
These processes are animated, given motion, by unfolding combinations of 
people and things. Such processes are often contested and negotiated, and 
include the on-going production of meaning, which in conditions of modernity 
typically require the constant renewal of one’s identity as old ways of life 
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crumble and new ones emerge. The processes are relational in the sense that 
individuals and groups are never islands unto themselves, but are always 
situated in networks of social relations. The subjectivity and behaviour of people 
are profoundly influenced by the norms and expectations embedded within 
these social relations. Events and processes cannot be understood without 
grasping their positioning at the intersection of the various sets of dynamic 
social and material relations that provide them with their conditions of 
existence.  
 
 But Mead goes beyond the pragmatism of James and Dewey in that Mead’s 
variant of pragmatism is better described as “social pragmatism,” i.e. both a 
thoroughly inter-subjective process philosophy entirely compatible with the principles 
of the scientific experimental method (setting Mead apart from James and Dewey), 
and a progressive world-view at home with radical democracy (which places him 
closer to Dewey). As a process philosophy, Mead’s social pragmatism is at odds with 
dualistic modes of thinking from Platonism to modern Cartesian philosophy, with 
their characteristic ontological distinctions between mind and body, or between 
thought and action. According to such dualistic philosophies, things can be studied 
independently of the uses people give them and, conversely, ideas, beliefs, and 
practices can be studied separately from the environment in which they play out. By 
contrast, for Mead, human agents are fundamentally problem-solvers and thought’s 
main function is to guide social action to the solution of practical problems that 
confront individuals in their dealings with the environment.  
 It is through the lenses of social pragmatism that Mead approaches modernity. 
The western variant of modernity can be described as a field of discourse defined by 
the tension between a dominant paradigm and several, less successful, alternatives. 
Within each paradigm, a plurality of proposals has been generated to answer those 
fundamental problematics, although no definitive answer has been forthcoming. The 
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dominant paradigm’s designation varies widely, although some reference to 
“liberalism” and “rationalism” are usually in order. From this viewpoint: (1) the 
objective and distant scientist of positivism, (2) the disembodied and instrumental self 
of neoclassical economics and rational choice theory, and (3) the abstract rights-
endowed individual of political liberalism are but different aspects of one and the 
same conception of human beings and their place in the world. One of my main 
arguments here is that Mead’s thinking can be better understood by reference to his 
(highly critical) responses to the three problematics that have defined the parameters 
of modern philosophical reflection since its inception, that is, science, selfhood, and 
democratic politics.  
 A few words on each of these problematics are now in order. At the heart of 
the modern project is science. The confidence – exemplarily illustrated by figures 
such as Galileo, Bacon, or Newton – in the combined powers of human reason and the 
principles of the experimental scientific method is a fundamental component of what 
it is to be modern. Central to the modern epistemological problematic is the tradition 
inaugurated by René Descartes’ Discourse on Method (1637). Classical pragmatists 
tend to reject this tradition on the grounds that it assumes an insurmountable divide 
between the realm of material, objective things, and the sphere of idealist, subjective 
phenomena. The pragmatist alternative to the “Cartesian chasm between matter and 
mind,” to use Mead’s expression, is to equate knowing with intelligent problem-
solving in particular contexts of action. The pragmatist epistemological critique is also 
thoroughly historicist. The pragmatist alternative to the rational, individualistic 
liberalism of a tradition that runs from Hobbes and Descartes to Kant points to an 
approach that takes temporality and historical time seriously. Mead’s alternative to the 
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abstract, atomistic, and instrumentally rational individual of the contractualist 
tradition is a historically situated social self whose rationality is defined in terms of 
the creative resolution of concrete action-problems.  
 Closely connected with the epistemological critique of abstract individualistic 
rationalism and its rigid dichotomies, Mead’s response to the modern problematic of 
selfhood is usually regarded as his main contribution to the social sciences. In which 
sense is this problematic of selfhood distinctively modern? The relation between 
identity and modernity is clarified once one realizes that modernity continually erodes 
certain key markers of certainty (such as tradition or religion), while it constantly 
strives to recover them in new guises. It is out of this constant and inevitable 
questioning of one’s place in the world that modern identity is forged, Mead argues. 
 At the core of the political dimension of the western variant of modernity is 
the human effort to reconcile notions of individual autonomy and liberty on the one 
hand, and of predictability and certainty on the other. Contrary to what is usually 
assumed, constitutionalism and the rule of law are not distinctively modern, although 
they have both developed new forms in the past couple of centuries. What is 
distinctively modern is the assertion of individual rights and, to a certain extent, the 
demand for universal social equality. What makes one more modern than the other is 
their orientation in time. While constitutionalism is fundamentally retrospective (one 
has to refer back to the founding text of the polity even if one wishes to interpret it in 
the light of current problems), individual rights-based perspectives involve claims and 
aspirations that tend to be future-oriented and are, therefore, distinctively modern. 
Liberal individualistic moral theory, from which the doctrine of universal human 
rights stems, is thus the dominant discursive resource of political modernity, in 
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A Problem-Solving Conception of Science 
 
These modern problematics of science, selfhood, and democratic politics shape 
Mead’s key research interests. Mead’s preoccupations include a problem-solving 
conception of science, a thoroughly social and inter-subjective understanding of the 
human self, an original account of creativity, a distinctively pragmatist notion of the 
meaning and theory of objects, and an emphasis upon democratic deliberation. I 
discuss these five issues in turn.  
 Mead sees the scientific method of experimental science as the most 
developed and systematic application of human intelligence to the resolution of 
problems in specific segments of the unquestioned world in which we live. However, 
this does not equate to a positivist understanding of scientific method, according to 
which the methods of the natural sciences are paradigmatic for all other scientific 
disciplines. Mead is all too aware of the fact that the relation between objects of 
perception and the scientific laws supposed to explain them is not without obstacles. 
In the social sciences, the problematic character of this relation is all the more obvious 
given the self-reflective nature of their object of study. For Mead, a truly scientific 
social psychology does not limit itself to the study of externally observable behaviour. 
Rather, behaviour is to be located within an environment composed of both human 
and non-human agents and to be analyzed, in both its observable and non-observable 
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aspects, as oriented to the solution of concrete action-problems. Mead’s allegiance to 
an experimental and problem-solving conception of science sheds important light 
upon the foundations of his system of thought. From the beginning of his career, 
Mead actively pursued research in the domain of the history and philosophy of 
science, endorsing a problem-solving conception of scientific activity that would lead 
his inquiries into the social nature of human consciousness and to the moral and 
political question of: “how should man live in society?” 
 
A Social, Inter-Subjective Self 
 
There are two main components to Mead’s treatment of modern selfhood. On the one 
hand, he discusses it from the perspective of childhood development. In particular, the 
genesis of the self is explained by means of two developmental stages. The first is the 
stage of “play,” during which children learn how to put themselves in the place of 
another individual. At this time children acquire a self – they do this by learning to 
take the role of other individuals. The second developmental stage is that of the 
“game,” a more elaborate and demanding social experience. Here children have to 
take the role not only of a single individual, but also of all the individuals involved in 
the game. Moreover, children have to learn how to coordinate their actions according 
to the rules of the game. At this juncture, Mead introduces one of his best known 
concepts, the notion of the “generalized other.” With this notion, Mead refers to the 
social attitudes and norms a child internalizes as part of their process of development. 
By learning how to take the role of the “generalized other,” children acquire the 
ability to import the attitudes of the social group into their own selves. Thus they 
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begin to see themselves from the perspective of everyone else.  
 On the other hand, Mead analyses the self from the viewpoint of its internal 
structure. Following the insights of his fellow pragmatists James and Dewey, Mead 
conceives of the self as an ongoing social process with two distinct phases. On the one 
hand, there is the “I.” Mead describes the “I” as the spontaneous response of the 
individual to the social situation. On the other hand, there is the “me,” which refers to 
a socially structured, conscious self-image that we build by seeing ourselves through 
the eyes of others (MR, 20). Imagine having breakfast this morning – you can see 
yourself having milk and cereals, talking to your parents, and so on. The “I” is that 
phase of the self that remembers, while the “me” is the remembered self-image. For 
Mead, the “I” is a source of novelty and creativity, indispensable for the assertion of 
individuality, while the “me” refers to the set of organized social attitudes within 
one’s self. Mead thus rules out the rigid distinction between inner subjective life, and 
external objective reality. On the contrary, he conceives of the self as a process 
through which social experiences are permanently incorporated into the self (through 
the “me”) and reconstructed by the “I.” Even though their fusion can and does occur 
in certain circumstances (such as in episodes of heightened emotions), the fact 
remains that the internal structure of the self is a process characterized by the 
dialectical relation between these two aspects or phases. In turn, that dialectical 
relation between the “I” and the “me” (i.e. the self) is but a phase of a more general 






A crucial element of the dialectic is social creativity. For Mead, creativity is not 
limited to the figure of the “artist” or the “genius.” Rather, creativity is a universal 
human ability. Every rational individual is endowed, Mead argues, with the ability to 
cope creatively with concrete action problems. The extent to which individual 
creativity is developed and refined is as much a question of personal development as 
it depends upon the kind of social experience one is exposed to. In turn, the degree of 
collective creativity a given community attains (expressed, for instance, in the quality 
of its artistic or scientific achievements) depends, as Mead puts it, upon the actual 
scope offered to: “individuality – for original, unique, or creative thinking and 
behavior on the part of the individual self within it.” (MSS, 221). The more 
democratic a society is, the more space it will allow for the expression of the 
individuality of its members. Crucially, Mead does not reduce creativity to the mere 
choice of alternative paths of action. Rather, the experience of living in a democracy 
stimulates creative thinking (and acting) regarding those very choices. Hence 
creativity is closely related to social criticism. The more one is immersed in the values 
of a community, the more able one is to exercise creative self-critical judgment of 
those democratic values in order to imagine alternative and more efficient policies, or 
more just institutional arrangements.  
 For Mead, then, individual and social creativity are but different phases of the 
same process by which original and innovative solutions are imagined to answer the 
problems individuals and groups face in everyday life. As an expression of reflective 
thinking, creativity is both a feature of the human species and a defining characteristic 





Pragmatist Meaning and a Theory of Objects 
 
A key element of Mead’s social pragmatism is his theory of meaning. For Mead, 
meaning is neither a subjective phenomenon lodged in the individual mind nor 
something external to it. Mead describes the logical structure of meaning as an inner 
triad composed of the gesture of the first organism, the responding gesture of the 
second organism, and the “resultant” of the social act. The response of the second 
organism to the gesture of the first is the interpretation of that gesture – this response 
brings out that meaning. Meaning is thus implicit in the structure of the social act. As 
such, meaning is to be found objectively in social conduct. Mead uses the example of 
a footprint of a bear to explain his argument. The footprint is the symbol of a bear. 
When we come across such a footprint, we associate that imprinted piece of mud with 
the passage of a bear at a certain previous moment. We might be afraid, not of the 
footprint but of what it means – the bear. So the footprint is the symbol, the bear is its 
meaning (i.e., the ‘resultant’ of the social act), and to be able to identify such a 
symbol as leading to such a meaning is the distinctive feature of human intelligence. 
Hence individuals create symbols to indicate, to themselves as well as to other 
members of the group, the implications of a certain object or gesture. In a sense, then, 
symbolization creates objects. The piece of mud only becomes a “footprint” when an 
individual looks at it and interprets it as meaning “bear.” The bear’s footprint thus 
becomes what Mead calls a “social object.” “Social objects” include whatever has a 
common meaning to the participants in the social act, from physical objects to oneself 
and other selves, scientific, religious, or political objects. Crucially, Mead conceives 
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of the process of meaning-creation between individuals and social objects as 
dialectically generative. From the continuous tension between individuals and objects, 
new individuals and new objects continually emerge (MR, 38). Mead illustrates his 
thesis through the societal shift towards modernity (MR, 40-41). Modern individuals 
have emerged as new objects gradually came into being, including physical objects 
(e.g. technological innovations such as the steam engine), scientific objects (e.g. new 
theories such as Einstein’s theory of general relativity), or political objects, such as 
the seminal idea of political equality discussed by Tocqueville in Democracy in 
America (1835-1840), or legally established public lawmaking bodies such as 




Whilst “science and democracy” is a well-known pragmatist motto, in Mead it 
acquires an added significance given his more prominent favouring than both James 
and Dewey of experimental science. In Mind, Self, and Society, Mead speaks of an 
attitude in which the social psychological mechanism of “taking the role of the other” 
enables the individual to: “enter into the attitudes of the group and to mediate between 
them by making his own experience universal, so that others can enter into this form 
of communication through him.” (MSS, 257) Mead is here referring to the statesman, 
whose ideal stance is as universal as the community in which he lives. But his 
argument is not limited to singular figures. Mead explicitly refers to the whole body 
of citizens. Democratic politics - “this great co-operative community process which is 
going on,” (MSS, 188) - depends upon the level of participation and communicative 
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interaction of all citizens.  
 An example might help clarify Mead’s position. Imagine a community facing 
the following political and moral dilemma. A nuclear power plant is to be built near 
where they live, creating jobs and tax revenues, but at the cost of a potential large-
scale disaster. From the standpoint of individual members of the community, what is 
the right thing to do? Should one support or oppose the plan? One possibility is to 
give priority to the way moral norms are applied by taking into account the specific 
character of that situation. Moral norms such as the “safeguard of public health” or 
the “betterment of material life” would thus be assessed in the light of the particular 
characteristics of that situation. Is the region prone to earthquakes? Is the company 
that is to build the power plant a reliable one? Which type of nuclear reactor is to be 
installed? Another possibility is to provide a universal justification for the moral 
norms involved. The idea here is that any given moral norm that could be applied in 
any conceivable situation would also be considered adequate in that particular 
situation.  
 Mead proposes a third alternative, which is both universalistic and sensitive to 
the particular character of the situation. Mead’s suggestion is that the community 
addresses the problem collectively, and eventually reaches a consensual solution. To 
be legitimate, such a consensus would have to result from an authentic inter-
subjective process. What Mead has in mind is an open, free, and unconstrained public 
deliberation on the relative merits of all the “working hypotheses” for the resolution 
of the problem at hand. The outcome of such a public deliberation would then be a 
moral solution. It should by now be relatively clear where Mead locates the ultimate 
source of legitimacy in a democracy. Mead places his faith in the “informed 
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citizenry,” whose wisdom is to be nurtured and promoted through education and 
whose active and continued civic participation is an essential ingredient of democratic 
life. An active public sphere, understood as a communicative network established by 
individual citizens in order to cope with common issues, is thus of pivotal importance. 
Mead’s reliance upon the principles of the scientific method as valid referents to 
moral and political action should not be confused, therefore, with the technocratic and 
elitist solutions that emerged in the aftermath of World War I. On the contrary, Mead 
interprets the classical pragmatist motto “science and democracy” in radical 
democratic terms – if human rationality is a constitutive feature of the human self, 
then the “method of intelligence” is available, at least potentially, to all members of 
the political community. In this specific sense, I argue that Mead, no less than Dewey, 
can be seen as a forerunner of contemporary deliberative democrats. 
 
Seeing Things Differently: What is Involved in Claiming and 
Contesting Rights? 
 
Alongside deliberative democracy, modern individual rights are another topic that 
caught Mead’s attention (MR, 221-244). Rights are conceived by Mead as part and 
parcel of political modernity, and specifically, as a constitutive part of the normative 
structure of modern political communities (Silva 2013). Understood as “social 
objects,” rights are both an aspiration and a defining feature of processes of political 
modernization. As such, rights such as the right to health care or the right to freedom 
of association help constitute individuals into modern citizens. Mead’s great 
achievement has been to render this idea, which could have remained as an orthodox 
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political philosophical insight, into the basis for post-metaphysical working 
hypotheses. They are ‘post-metaphysical’ in the sense that working hypotheses for the 
moral resolution of conflicts are tested by being subjected to democratic contestation 
and debate in which a potential variety of principles  - perhaps involving competing 
rights - are brought into dialogue with a range of in situ realities. Resolution is not 
sought simply by appealing to transcendental criteria. Testing hypotheses involves as 
much solving scientific problems involving epistemology, social psychology, and 
political science, as it requires solving ethical-practical problems which require a 
democratic political solution. To seek combined solutions to these problems is as 
urgent today as it was in Mead’s time.  
 The notion of the “generalized other” plays a key role in Mead’s approach to 
rights. First, Mead’s concept of the '“generalized other'” enables us to appreciate the 
extent to which rights are a common attitude shared by members of a political 
community. Mead’s point is straightforward. Any given society’s “generalized other” 
encompasses common attitudes, i.e. what we would today call “social norms.” Rules 
are one kind of social norm. Very much like a game’s rules, social norms help define 
the institutional framework upon which social cooperation is possible, rights-norms 
among them. As such, rights are an objective component of the normative structure of 
modern societies.  
 Second, internalization of the attitude of the generalized other means having a 
general attitude towards all members of the community, including oneself. Mead’s 
point is that rights are as much part of the normative structure of a society as they are 
part of the political identity of each individual citizen. But Mead has a very specific 
understanding of what this entails. To have a right is not the same as having a 
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physical object, something that can be accumulated, measured, quantified. As a social 
object, to have a right is to enter a political relation, to belong to a community whose 
norms include that right as something anybody can assert and everybody can 
recognize. Mead sees the social relationships rights refer to as intrinsically reflexive. 
They require every member of the political community to take both roles or positions 
involved in a rights relation, that of entitlement and that of the obligation to respect it. 
This is how rights help constitute individual political identities.  
 Third, for Mead, to conceive of rights as relational and reflexive is also to 
assert their contested nature. The contested nature of rights stems from the tension 
within the social self between the “I” and the “me,” the former being a source of 
unpredictable creativity, the latter ensuring the internalization of social conventions 
through the attitude of the generalized other. The dialectical nature of the relation 
between the two phases of the self means that social norms, rights-norms included, 
are continuously internalized and reproduced (through the “me”) while being 
contested and questioned (through the “I”). For Mead, rights are contested in two 
different ways. First, rights can be contested within oneself. One’s legal 
consciousness is a dialectical process, responsive to concrete action-problems in real-
world situations, and potentially evolves over time in contradictory ways. Second, 
rights can be contested between different selves. Politicians, judges, and ordinary 
citizens often disagree about the interpretation and application of rights. For instance, 
the application of the right to health care can either be understood in terms of a 
publicly funded universal health care scheme or a means-tested, contributory 
insurance scheme. In this sense, to affirm the contested nature of rights is to affirm the 
political nature of processes of identity-formation that sustain the claim to rights.  
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 Contested, reflexive, relational; this is how Mead conceives of rights, whose 
meaning lies in concrete patterns of political interaction, the institutionalization of 
which is as much a symbolic as a material process. The inscription of rights in the text 
of political constitutions radically amplifies their reach and implications, transforming 
a disruptive idea into a world-making legal concept. The meaning of rights can only 
be fully understood by reference to the materiality of this process of meaning-
production. 
 
Legacies and Unfinished Business 
 
Interest in the materiality of processes of meaning-production such as these has been 
central in recent appropriations of Mead’s work by pragmatic sociologists. This has 
been partly made possible by the recent publication of texts such as “On the Self and 
Teleological Behavior” or “On Social Consciousness and Social Science,” (MR, 21-
44; 183-192). In these texts, Mead can be seen to follow in the footsteps of Hegel’s 
theory of objectification, yet he resists Marx’s one-sided interpretation of it as 
fetishism. Mead consistently rejects the choice between materialism and idealism. 
Rather, he insists upon taking the materiality of meaning-production seriously. For 
instance, a political constitution is neither to be reduced to an expression of material 
interests nor is it the progressive realization of reason. For Mead, the meaning of a 
political constitution is dialectically defined in the relationship between its specific 
material form, its content, and the surrounding environment, which includes 
authorized interpreters as well as the cultural and socio-economic context within 
which legal agents operate. This means that constitutions constitute citizens in a very 
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specific sense. While it is citizens who write and enact a constitution (e.g. through a 
constituent assembly), once that constitution is in place it powerfully shapes the lives 
of these citizens and of future generations, ruling out some options and pushing for 
others, as well as functioning as a powerful political symbol (e.g. of national unity). It 
is in this sense that Mead conceives of the: “mutual interrelationship of the 
individuals and their environments.” (MR, 27) For Mead, persons and things do not 
live separate lives. Rather, they mutually determine one another. The implication of 
this philosophical insight for contemporary sociology is obvious. In a world in which 
the lives of things and the lives of people are fundamentally entangled, the central 
task of neo-Meadian pragmatic sociology is to study how this dialectic plays itself out 
empirically with a view to destabilizing pervasive, yet unduly rigid, approaches.  
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Psychology” course at the University of Chicago taken by a professional stenographer 
hired by former students. Prominent Mead scholars Dan Huebner and Hans Joas 
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